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ABSTRACT
Public key infrastructure (PKI), comprised of X.509 certifi-
cates (PKIX) and cryptographic protocols, helps ensure se-
cure communications for the Web. The creation of PKI is
a fascinating story that dates back to the 1970s and came
about thanks to people with a strong desire to democra-
tize privacy and security on the Internet. PKIX became the
model implementation for PKI that included a fundamen-
tal, openly defined, digital certificate. This paper offers an
overview of PKIX for a general audience. It also encourages
students to explore some of these ideas, with a discussion on
modeling and simulation of costs associated with certificate
validation, and some computational number theory.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Operations
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Millions of people use the World Wide Web (Web) on a
daily basis. They use it for education, social networking,
email, banking, shopping, and much more. The majority of
users do not give much thought to the underlying security
behind the Web. Some may pause to consider the risk of
entering their credit card number on a shopping site, for
example; however, in general, security is a mystery to them.
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In this paper, we describe some of the basic security con-
cepts and implementations used by the Web. We write for a
general audience, but the more technical sections, e.g., mod-
eling and simulation, are intended primarily for students.
Our primary goals are to 1) provide a general introduc-
tion to public key infrastructure (PKI) and cryptography,
2) describe some of the implementations for one of the fun-
damental operations in PKI: certificate validation, and 3)
discuss some simple models and simulations of costs associ-
ated with these implementations.
Section 2 introduces the reader to PKI, with some his-
torical context. In Section 3, we define some of the main
concepts used by the Web’s PKI, including X.509 certifi-
cates. Section 4 describes some of the current implementa-
tions used on the Web for validating certificates. Sections 5
and 6 are primarily intended for students and discuss com-
putational thinking, modeling, and simulation. A brief dis-
cussion of related work is in Section 7. Section 8 shifts the
focus from certificate validation and offers an overview of
public key cryptography and its connection to number the-
ory. Finally, Section 9 offers some concluding remarks.
2. BACKGROUND
The history of PKI and public key cryptography (PKC),
as used by the Web today, is a fascinating story. It is an
interesting mix of human, technological, and mathematical
ingenuity. It is the foundation on which we have connected
millions of people around the world and also built a multi-
billion dollar e-commerce industry. And while it continues
to serve us very well, it is not perfect. As we will discuss in
this paper, PKI and cryptography for the Web continue to
evolve in interesting ways.
For hundreds of years, it was assumed that if two people
wanted to communicate privately, they would need to share
a mutually agreed upon secret “key”. One of the most often
cited examples is the Caesar cipher, used by Julius Caesar
to send and receive private messages. By taking a standard
alphabet and “rotating” (shifting, with wrap-around at the
end) the letters by some fixed number, e.g., 13, one could
construct an encrypted message by a simple substitution of
letters. The secret key for this particular cipher would there-
fore be “13” (and the implied algorithm would be “rotate the
alphabet”).
PKC introduced the remarkable idea of a “public” key,
i.e., a key that could be accessible by anyone. It seemed
to go against common sense. If someone wanted to share a
private message with someone else, why even consider using
a publicly known key? The simple answer is that it allowed
for communication between any two people and avoided the
problem of manually exchanging a private key ahead of time.
There will still be a private (secret) key in PKC; however, it
will remain private to a single individual. PKC and its use
of a public-private key pair helped make it possible for two
total strangers to securely exchange digital messages over
a potentially insecure network. Explanations of how PKC
works range from quite simplistic[37] to very formal[17][27].
Levy’s Crypto[22] captures the colorful history of PKC
and PKI that a general audience should understand and en-
joy. The book conveys very well the human aspect of these
discoveries. It tells how one person’s relentless drive to de-
mocratize privacy led to the remarkable discovery1 of prac-
tical security on the then nascent Internet (and eventually
to the World Wide Web). Whitfield Diffie, after teaming up
with Martin Hellman, published their seminal paper[7] in
1976. They proposed a hypothetical “one-way (mathemat-
ical) function” as a mechanism to openly reveal an encryp-
tion technique without any (practical) way of inverting it
to obtain the decryption technique. In less than two years,
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman[31] published their landmark
RSA (from their initials) paper that proposed a practical
implementation for such a one-way function. More will be
said about this in Section 8. A short time after the RSA
paper appeared, one of Adleman’s students[18] published a
thesis on the concept of certificates - something that would
evolve into X.509 certificates, discussed in the next section.
Diffie and Hellman were recognized for their work with the
A.M. Turing Award2, one of the most prestigious awards in
computer science, in 2015. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman re-
ceived the Turing award in 2002 for their RSA cryptographic
system.
3. PKIX OVERVIEW
The PKI we discuss in this paper is the de facto standard
used for the Web. It is known as PKIX because it uses X.509
certificates, described in more detail below. In the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 5280[5], we learn:
The goal of the Internet PKI is to meet the needs
of deterministic, automated identification, authen-
tication, access control, and authorization func-
tions.
In addition to defining an X.509 certificate, RFC 5280
also describes certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and an al-
gorithm for performing certificate path validation. We will
describe each of these concepts in more detail below. RFC
5280, together with public key cryptography, are essentially
the culmination of Diffie and Hellman’s 1976 paper.
What does all of this terminology mean for an ordinary
user of the Web? When a person uses a Web browser to visit
a “secure” site, i.e., a site whose URL is prefixed with https
1Perhaps more accurately, rediscovery and made public for
the first time.
2http://amturing.acm.org/
(secure HTTP protocol), there is a sequence of (mostly hid-
den) steps taken to help ensure the site is trustworthy and
that communication between it and a browser is secure. The
secure Web site will be in possession of a unique X.509 cer-
tificate (Section 3.1). Using a secure3 “digital handshake”,
the browser will receive this certificate from the Web server
and try to determine whether it is valid. If it is valid, the
browser proceeds to visit the site; if not, it will (should) no-
tify the user that the site is untrustworthy and refuse to visit
the site. Some of the reasons for a certificate being invalid
are described below.
However, PKIX is not a perfect solution, for multiple rea-
sons. There have been instances, for example, when certifi-
cates should have been revoked and were not[41].
We want to make readers aware of some simple visual
cues their browsers provide that indicate the level of security
(in theory) associated with a Web site. Although different
browsers have slightly different cues, typically the URL in
the address bar will be prefixed with some sort of small
image decorator. Figure 1 lists three different URLs and
their respective security decorators. Typically, if a Web site
uses HTTPS, it will have a padlock to indicate “secure”.
There are still many, many Web sites that use HTTP instead
of HTTPS. We show the Web site for CNN news as just
one example. Google and others[4][33] are trying to make
adoption of HTTPS more widespread. If a HTTPS Web site
has taken extra effort (and likely paid a premium price), they
can be designated as an Extended Validation (EV) site. The
decorator will then include both a padlock and the Web’s
site’s organization name preceding the HTTPS, as shown in
the Twitter address bar. We will demonstrate later how a
user can obtain more detailed certificate information either
from the browser or using command line tools. It should be
noted that it is also possible to visit a HTTPS Web site, but
the padlock decorator be absent, indicating it has, for some
reason(s), been deemed insecure. This would be the case, for
example, when visiting a site that is streaming content using
a browser plugin that has been deemed insecure. Again, a
user can easily discover these details on their own.
Figure 1: Security visual decorators in a browser.
3.1 X.509 Certificate
Just as a birth certificate provides a person an authen-
tic document stating their birth date and place, an X.509
certificate is intended to authenticate an entity on the Web.
And just like a birth certificate, an X.509 certificate is issued
by some trusted authority.
The contents of an X.509 certificate (currently at version
3) are defined in RFC 5280. We list just a few of its fields:
Serial Number: Used to uniquely identify the certifi-
cate.
3Using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.
Subject: The entity associated with the public key. (e.g.,
www.iu.edu)
Signature Algorithm: The algorithm used to create the
signature. (e.g., SHA-256 with RSA Encryption)
Signature: The digital signature to verify that it came
from the issuer. (string of bytes)
Issuer: The entity that verified the information and is-
sued the certificate. (e.g., Internet2/InCommon)
Valid-From: The start date of the certificate’s validity.
(e.g., November 6, 2014)
Valid-To: The end date of the certificate’s validity. (e.g.,
November 6, 2017)
Public Key: Public key associated with this certificate.
(string of bytes)
Issuing Distribution Point: CRL (a URI)
Authority Information Access: OCSP Responder (a
URI)
Fingerprint: A hash of the certificate.
We emphasize the fact that a certificate is not some myste-
rious, hidden entity from a Web user. This is in keeping with
the goal of providing an open, secure Internet that Diffie,
Hellman, and others had in mind from the beginning. If a
user wants to investigate the detailed contents of the certifi-
cates associated with a secure HTTPS web site, simply click
the padlock decorator to the left of the address bar and then
a Details and/or View Certificate button that subsequently
appear. Figures 3 and 4 show some of this information (in
the Chrome browser). Clicking on any one of the Certificate
Authorities (discussed next) (Root, Intermediate, or Leaf)
will reveal details specific to its certificate.
3.2 Certificate Authority
A certificate authority (CA) is a trusted, third-party en-
tity who issues and, when necessary, revokes certificates.
The CA’s digital signature becomes part of the certificate
itself so that it can be verified. Quoting from RFC 5280:
CAs are responsible for indicating the revocation
status of the certificates that they issue. Revo-
cation status information may be provided using
the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[RFC2560], certificate revocation lists (CRLs), or
some other mechanism. In general, when revoca-
tion status information is provided using CRLs,
the CA is also the CRL issuer. However, a CA
may delegate the responsibility for issuing CRLs
to a different entity.
Not surprisingly, most CAs charge a fee, e.g., a few hun-
dred dollars per year, to issue certificates and provide the
necessary services associated with them. However, there is
currently at least one (automated) CA offering certificates
and services for free[24].
The large number of HTTPS Web sites necessitates a hi-
erarchical structure of CAs. The idea of having a single CA
be responsible for all certificates is not only technically in-
feasible, it is a really bad idea from a security perspective.
Single points of failure are never good. Therefore, we have a
hierarchy that consists of root CAs, intermediate CAs, and
leaf CAs, as depicted in Figure 2. Root CAs are the most
trusted and (hopefully) the most secure. Root CAs issue
certificates to intermediate CAs and intermediate CAs is-
sue certificates to other intermediate CAs or to leaf CAs,
the end-entity in the chain. Thus, there is a unique path,
or chain, from a leaf CA to a root CA. As we discuss in
Section 4, when a browser validates the (leaf) certificate as-
sociated with a Web site, it must validate all certificates in
that chain.
RootCA
CA1 CA2 CA3
L1 L2 L3 CA4 CA5
L4 L5 CA6
L6 L7 L8 L9
Figure 2: Hierarchical CA model
Figure 3: A certificate and its chain of CAs.
Figure 4: An EV certificate.
For those who would like to see more details of the in-
formation exchanged during the secure (TLS) handshake,
including the (encoded) certificates, the free OpenSSL soft-
ware allows this. For example, running the following com-
mand4 from a terminal window will return information re-
lated to the leaf certificate of the specified Web server:
$ openssl s_client -connect www.iu.edu:443
Appending a -showcerts argument to the above com-
mand will output all certificates in the chain.
4. CERTIFICATE VALIDATION
When a user visits a HTTPS Web site and the TLS hand-
shake occurs between a browser and Web server, the browser
receives a leaf certificate and must validate it. However,
since there is a path of certificates connected to that leaf,
the process is actually multi-step. RFC 5280 describes the
conditions that need to be met for certificate path validation:
1. for all x in 1, ..., n-1, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by the trust (root) anchor;
3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated (i.e., the
target certificate); and
4. for all x in 1, ..., n, the certificate was valid at the time
in question.
Part of the process of determining whether an individual
certificate is valid includes 1) verifying the current date is
within its Valid-From/To dates, and 2) checking that it has
not been revoked5. It is this latter step, checking for certifi-
cate revocation, that we explore more fully in this section
by examining various implementations.
Liu et al.[23] provide a review of certificate revocation
implementations and analyze the myriad combinations of
browsers and operating systems, showing how each may pro-
cess the revocation status differently. We discuss some of the
same implementations here, albeit for a more general audi-
ence.
4.1 Certificate Revocation Lists
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are just that - lists
of certificates that have been revoked. An entry in a CRL
contains a certificate’s (unique) serial number and the date
it was revoked. The entire CRL file is digitally signed by the
CA that maintains it. RFC 5280 states that either a CA or
an entity authorized by the CA can issue CRLs and lists
eight reasons why a certificate might be revoked, including
two of the more egregious: the certificate’s private key was
compromised or, worse yet, a CA was compromised.
When a browser receives a certificate, part of the valida-
tion process is to check if the certificate has been revoked.
Assuming the certificate contains a CRL issuing distribution
point, the browser can download the entire CRL and check
to see if it contains this certificate’s serial number. If it does
not, then the browser would check for the next certificate in
the chain. If it reaches the RootCA (trust anchor) and has
not found it in a CRL, the browser will verify the RootCA
is in its pre-loaded list of trusted root CAs.
There are some obvious challenges and overhead costs as-
sociated with CRLs. Maintenance, i.e., keeping it up to date
and secure, is primarily a burden of the CAs. The browsers
4443 is the default port for HTTPS.
5There are other important steps, e.g., verifying signatures,
that we skip over here.
and client computers incur the costs associated with pro-
cessing the CRL, i.e. verifying it is valid and searching it for
certificates. We will discuss costs more in Section 5.
4.2 Online Certificate Status Protocol
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)[32] pro-
vides an alternative to the CRL. Rather than have a browser
download an entire CRL file, OCSP offers a lighter weight
solution. The browser can now just send the certificate to
an OCSP responder and receive a status of good, revoked,
or unknown.
Not surprisingly, there are trade-offs with both CRLs and
OCSP. Although OCSP suggests less data transmission, it
is possible an OCSP responder would be down. This would
mean a browser could not determine the revocation status
of a certificate; whereas, if the browser had downloaded an
entire CRL, the revocation check might be a local operation.
4.3 OCSP Stapling
An extension of the OCSP concept is actually an extension
to the TLS protocol[14]. OCSP Stapling[29] will let a Web
server cache OCSP results (good, revoked, or unknown) and
send that result to the browser during the TLS handshake.
This would eliminate the need for the browser to contact an
OCSP responder.
Once again there are trade-offs. Not all Web servers sup-
port OCSP Stapling. The SSL Pulse6 reports that, as of
September 2016, only about 25% of the “most popular” Web
sites support OCSP Stapling. And the analysis in [23] sug-
gests a much lower percentage by less popular Web sites.
4.4 Public Key Pinning
Public Key Pinning[25], commonly referred to as HTTP
Public Key Pinning (HPKP), is an effort to help circumvent
untrusted certificates from compromised CAs. The HPKP
protocol[9] defines a new HTTP header that lets Web servers
tell browsers to remember, or “pin”, their public keys over
a period of time. During that time, user agents (UAs) will
require that the host presents a certificate chain including
at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose finger-
print matches one of the pinned fingerprints for that host.
HPKP was initiated at Google and is supported by their
Chrome browser (>= version 46), as well as recent versions
of Firefox; however, other leading browsers do not currently
support it. By reducing the number of trusted authorities
who can authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the
pin, pinning may reduce the incidence of man-in-the-middle
attacks due to compromised CAs.
Results from the first comprehensive survey of HPKP are
reported in [19]. One observation made there is that HPKP
will not resolve the security issues surrounding mixed con-
tent, i.e., when an HTTPS page loads resources from an
HTTP origin.
4.5 Certificate Transparency
As its name suggests, Certificate Transparency (CT)[1] is
an attempt to introduce greater transparency into the tra-
ditional CA-issued certificate system. It is another Google-
backed project and the protocol is still considered experi-
mental[21]. Laurie and Doctorow have made a succinct ar-
gument for its adoption[20] and provide cases of compro-
mised CAs for justification. The basic idea is that when
6https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/
a CA issues a certificate, it sends a copy to a log. This
log server will be append-only, public (hence, transparent),
secure, monitored and audited. The security of the logs is
due, in part, to something called Merkle7 trees[28]. Browsers
could be pre-loaded with a list of these log servers, just as
they are pre-loaded with a list of trusted root CAs for CRLs.
The Let’s Encrypt8 CA referenced in Section 3.2 uses CT.
4.6 CRLSets
The Google Chrome browser has yet another approach for
checking for revoked certificates. By default, Chrome does
not perform a typical online, e.g., OCSP, revocation check
for certificates. Rather, Google crawls CAs and gathers se-
rial numbers of revoked certificates. The Chrome browser
is then updated with these CRLSets at least once a day
and revocation checking becomes a ”local” operation against
the CRLSet. This is an instance of the browser developer
(Google) shouldering the major cost of the certificate revo-
cation check.
5. MODELING COST
Jeannette Wing has been a leader in developing and pro-
moting the concept of Computational Thinking [40][39]. One
of the characteristics that helps define this skill set is “con-
ceptualizing, not programming”. She offers the following:
Computational thinking is using abstraction and
decomposition when attacking a large complex
task or designing a large complex system. It
is separation of concerns. It is choosing an ap-
propriate representation for a problem or model-
ing the relevant aspects of a problem to make it
tractable.
In this section, our goal is to help the (student) reader
conceptualize how one might model costs associated with the
various certificate validation implementations discussed in
the previous section. Clearly, modeling these costs is a com-
plex problem. As we have discussed, it involves a number
of different actors: browsers (clients), Web servers, CAs,
CRL servers, OCSP responders, etc. The network(s) could
even be considered actors. And the actors will have differ-
ent states and different behavioral parameters, e.g., X.509
certificates, CRLs, CPU speeds, number of cores, memory,
bandwidth, latency, etc. One could therefore imagine a cost
function that would involve many parameters:
Cost = F (x1, x2, ..., xN )
So how should we begin? Following Wing’s advice, we
decompose the problem and try to model just the relevant
aspects to make it more tractable. For example, let’s be-
gin by just considering CRL and OCSP models and the cost
of moving the data associated with checking for certificate
revocation over the network. Therefore, we define two func-
tions, each dependent on a single parameter, the size of the
data that is transferred:
CostCRL = F (revSize)
CostOCSP = F (revSize)
7Ralph Merkle was, along with Diffie and Hellman, one of
the early leaders in PKC. He was a student of Hellman.
8https://letsencrypt.org/certificates
How does one determine meaningful estimates for param-
eters? There are essentially two choices: perform your own
experiments to gather data or use data from published ex-
periments. Choosing the latter, we look at the experiments
performed in [23] and see that the size of CRLs can vary
considerably, from tens of kilobytes to tens of megabytes.
Obviously, the size of CRLs will spike if, for example, a CA
has been compromised and all the certificates it has issued
need to be revoked. The size of data being transmitted for
OCSP is going to be much smaller.
One might think latency, the amount of time it takes for a
data packet to travel between two endpoints (e.g., a browser
and a Web server), would be an important parameter for
determining cost. Indeed, there is considerable variability in
network latency, as anyone can see using the ping command
from a desktop terminal window. This is demonstrated by
pinging a “local” Web server versus one half way around the
world:
$ ping www.iu.edu
PING www.iu.edu : 56 data bytes
: icmp_seq=0 ttl=61 time=5.004 ms
: icmp_seq=1 ttl=61 time=4.354 ms
: icmp_seq=2 ttl=61 time=16.427 ms
$ ping www.tsinghua.edu.cn
PING www.d.tsinghua.edu.cn: 56 data bytes
: icmp_seq=0 ttl=233 time=306.366 ms
: icmp_seq=1 ttl=233 time=329.849 ms
: icmp_seq=2 ttl=233 time=282.476 ms
But is latency really that relevant for the problem of cer-
tificate validation? This is the type of question a modeler
needs to ask (and answer). Another important question to
keep in mind for modeling the cost of certificate validation
is: the cost for whom? After all, we have multiple actors,
as already mentioned above. For example, the cost that a
browser incurs will likely be very different from the cost in-
curred by a Web server, or OCSP responder, or any other
actor in our system.
One important feature the ping demonstration does re-
veal is noise. Note the varying times a data packet takes
to the same destination. There will always be noise, or
randomness, in measuring and modeling complex systems.
Therefore, in the generic Cost equation above, one of the xi
parameters would, in fact, be noise. Another fairly obvious
parameter would be the depth of the certificate path that
was discussed in Section 3.2. The revised Cost function then
becomes:
Cost = F (revSize, caDepth, noise)
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
After creating conceptual models to calculate the costs of
certificate validation, one needs to transform them into com-
puter code. And when dealing with complex systems, e.g.,
that involves multiple actors, parameters, and randomness,
the resulting code will be a system simulation, rather than
a simple, straightforward calculation.
Just as we had two choices for obtaining data for input
parameters, here too, we have two choices: write the sim-
ulation code yourself or adopt existing code. For this pa-
per, we adopt existing code (and tailor it for our needs).
The Application-Sensitive Access Control (ASAC) analysis
framework has been used to simulate a variety of access con-
trol models[12][13][11]. Since PKI can be considered an ac-
cess control mechanism (rf. statement from RFC 5280, Sec-
tion 3), the ASAC framework seems appropriate. However,
its use in other models is much more formal and exhaustive
than we will attempt here. Our use of the ASAC software
will be simple and suggestive, in the hope that students can
learn from the modeling and simulation and expand upon
it.
An ASAC simulation allows a modeler/programmer to:
define actors, define actors’ actions (commands and queries),
define costs (measures), perform multiple runs on multiple
models, and automatically plot results. The simulation soft-
ware is written in Java and plotting uses the open source
matplotlib[15] (Python) package. By default, all pairwise
plots of measures will be generated.
Figures 5 and 6 show pairwise plots for two models, CRL
and OCSP, and two measures, CA depth and certificate re-
vocation response size. The model associated with Figure 6
had more noise associated with the response size.
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Figure 5: CRL,OCSP: RevSize,CA depth,low noise
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Figure 6: CRL,OCSP: RevSize,CA depth,high noise
7. RELATED WORK
The simulation results presented here could possibly be
replicated using other software packages9. Any extensible,
discrete event simulation engine that models a state machine
of generic actors would be a good starting point. The ns-
3 software[30], for example, has been used to evaluate the
scalability of PKI [38] for models of the Smart Grid. In
another project, SSFnet[6] has been used to evaluate a very
large scale model of certification path discovery[42].
8. CRYPTO AND NUMBER THEORY
We have primarily discussed PKI and certificate valida-
tion in this paper. In this last section, we depart from
this focus and discuss public key cryptography (PKC). More
specifically, we discuss its connection to mathematics, pri-
marily number theory. PKC is responsible for the actual
encryption/decryption (cryptography) of the data that is
transmitted between a browser and the servers with whom
it communicates.
As mentioned in Section 2, Diffie and Hellman[7] discussed
one-way functions as a possible solution to PKC. They used
matrix inversion as an illustrative, but non-practical exam-
ple. The RSA paper[31] then revealed a practical one-way
function that would become responsible for the majority of
PKC used by the Web. In hindsight, this one-way function
seems rather obvious: larger integer factorization. You may
recall from a high school math class that integer factoriza-
tion leads us to the topic of prime numbers.
By definition, a prime number is a positive integer > 1
that cannot be factored. For example, 7 is prime; 15 is not
prime since it can be factored as 3 ∗ 5. The Fundamental
Theorem of Arithmetic states that every integer > 1 is ei-
ther prime or factors uniquely as a product of primes. For
this reason, primes have been called the atomic elements of
integers.
It is enlightening to experiment with computational num-
ber theory and we encourage readers to do so. Mathematica
is a full-featured commercial software package (and free if
used on a Raspberry Pi10 computer). Another popular, open
source package is SageMath. There are also freely available
books that provide an introduction to computational num-
ber theory[35][2].
In the context of PKI, PKC, and RSA, an obvious starting
point would be to explore the topic of integer factorization.
We demonstrate with SageMath and some relatively small
integers:
sage: factor(1234)
2 * 617
sage: factor(45678)
2 * 3 * 23 * 331
sage: factor(56789)
109 * 521
sage: factor(1111199999)
7^2 * 13 * 41 * 157 * 271
The factors for these are returned essentially instantaneously.
For much larger integers, as we will see below, this is not the
case.
9It is, in fact, good practice to demonstrate reproducible
results (at least qualitatively) using multiple software pack-
ages.
10http://www.wolfram.com/raspberry-pi/
It is interesting to think that prime numbers were once
considered just an esoteric topic of number theory, with no
known “real world” applications. G.H. Hardy, a renowned
pure mathematician once declared[8] that mathematicians
could rejoice knowing that number theory is so remote from
human activities that it would be kept “gentle and clean”.
Since he lived in the mid-20th century, he did not foresee
the Internet, its need for privacy, and a solution that would
involve one-way functions, integer factorization, and prime
numbers. Of course the RSA algorithm, with its use of large
integer factorization is not a unique one-way function. As a
teenager, Sarah Flannery[10] became something of a sensa-
tion when she proposed an alternative in 1999. While her
suggested algorithm did not ultimately withstand rigorous
testing, it was a testament to those interested in exploring
mathematical alternatives to the problem.
Factoring large integers has a fascinating history. In 1903,
Frank Cole revealed the two prime factors of the 21-digit
number 267 − 1. He had spent “3 years of Sundays” to dis-
cover this factorization [3]. Today, thanks to computers and
advances in computational number theory, we can factor this
same number in milliseconds:
sage: time factor(2^67 - 1)
CPU times: user 6.5 ms
It may come as a surprise that determining whether or
not a number is prime versus actually finding the factors of
the number are quite different. The latter is a much more
difficult problem. Consider factoring the following 40-digit
number (using SageMath):
sage: c=2630492240413883318777134293253671517529
sage: time is_prime(c)
CPU times: user 80 µs
False
sage: time factor(c)
CPU times: user 93.8 ms
48112959837082048697 * 54673257461630679457
Obviously this is not conclusive evidence, but assuming
SageMath is using reasonably state-of-the-art algorithms,
then it takes roughly a thousand times longer to factor this
particular number (millisecs) than to determine if it is prime
(microsecs).
The next two examples are simply intended to demon-
strate how difficult (time-consuming) it is for computers to
factor large integers. Given 2 N -digit primes, we multi-
ply them together and then ask Sage to factor the product.
When N = 30, it takes only 10 seconds; however, when
N = 40, it takes 13 minutes. Imagine if N is much larger.
We encourage readers to experiment for themselves. Sage-
Math also provides a free cloud service11.
# time to factor semiprime (of two 30-digit primes)
sage: p30=282174488599599500573849980909
sage: q30=115756986668303657898962467957
sage: pq=p30*q30
sage: time factor(pq)
CPU times: user 10 s
115756986668303657898962467957 *
282174488599599500573849980909
11https://cloud.sagemath.com
# factoring two 40-digit primes
sage: p40=2425967623052370772757633156976982469681
sage: q40=1451730470513778492236629598992166035067
sage: pq=p40*q40
sage: time factor(pq)
CPU times: user 13min 22s
1451730470513778492236629598992166035067 *
2425967623052370772757633156976982469681
A natural question to ask is how long integer factoriza-
tion will continue to be the dominant one-way function used
for PKC. There are at least two, yet to be realized break-
throughs that may affect this (negatively). One is something
called quantum computation[34]. Another, much more fun-
damental to mathematics, is called the Riemann Hypothe-
sis[26] and has been named a Millennium Prize Problem[16],
with a one million dollar prize for its proof. We encourage
readers to learn more about these exciting topics. Finally,
it should be noted that integer factorization is not the only
option available for PKC; elliptic curve cryptography[36][27]
is another popular choice.
9. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
We have reviewed some of the key ideas and interesting
history behind PKI and PKC. X.509 certificates play a fun-
damental role in PKI and we have demonstrated how any-
one using a Web browser can examine detailed information
contained in a certificate. The crucial step of certificate val-
idation, including the process of checking for revoked cer-
tificates, is an evolving process. We have discussed multi-
ple implementations and some of their trade-offs. We dis-
cussed briefly the challenge of modeling and provided a sim-
ple model for calculating costs of certificate validation. The
modeling process led to simulation and we demonstrated us-
ing the ASAC software framework. There is much more that
can be explored in modeling/simulating the PKI certificate
validation process and we hope we have sparked students’
interest.
Various stakeholders in the PKI landscape have different
incentives to improve it (or not). CAs, for example, would
probably prefer not to spend money on more modern com-
puters acting as OCSP responders. Web browser developers
may not want to implement a new, experimental certificate
validation protocol if its fate is unknown. Other stakehold-
ers likely have other (dis)incentives. With improvements in
PKI modeling, simulation, and analysis of results, perhaps
we can provide more evidence to support future decisions
and help make the Web more secure for all of us.
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